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The title of this conference, The International Criminal Court and the
Community of Nations, invokes the notion of an international community,
while the organization of sessions structures our discussions today in part
around the categories of states parties to the Rome Statute, on the one hand,
and non-party states, on the other. Accordingly, I have chosen to draw attention in my remarks to these groupings—international community, states parties, and non-states parties. Specifically, I will focus on how the institutionalization of international criminal law through the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the consequent division of the world
into states parties and non-states parties to the Rome Statute, may undermine
the notion that the international community as a whole condemns mass atrocity crimes.
I will begin with the idea of international community, and its connection
to the field of international criminal law, and then I will turn to the division of
the field into parties and non-parties, or supporters and opponents, of the ICC.
Lawyers and scholars of international law and international relations have
struggled to construct a uniform understanding of the concept of an “international community.” The concept is heavily used in cases, in treaties, and in
scholarly writing, often without much explanation, as if its meaning is selfevident.
By international community, I mean a conception of international community distinct from a mere collection of states, or even a collection of states
bound together by shared rules established in pursuit of some common interest. Rather, international community can be understood as a collection of
states and other actors that constitutes a community because of a set of shared
values.
The history of the international community and the history of international
criminal law are closely intertwined, as Nuremberg is often identified as a
moment when international community was born. As Christian Tomuschat
writes, with the Nuremberg trial, as well as the creation of the United Nations,
“[a]ll of a sudden . . . it appeared that there was a common moral ground
acknowledged by all states that demanded respect and could eventually be
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enforced through common institutions.”1 It is that sense of international community—a community built around shared values, a common ground of morality—that underlies the notion that an international community was born
with the Nuremberg tribunal. Moreover, it was that sense of international
community that allowed for the Nuremberg tribunal to exist.
What were those shared values at the heart of the project of international
criminal law? Rule of law; a conviction that no one, no matter how powerful,
is above the law; a shared intolerance for the crimes of the cruelty and magnitude of those that had taken place during the Second World War; and a conviction that the lives of victims are more important than the power of any
person or government. Consistent with theories of international cooperation
that conceptualize institutionalization as arising out of “common identities,”2
this idea of a set of shared values has continued to drive the field of international criminal law. Antonio Cassese notes that an essential feature of the
substantive prohibitions of international criminal law themselves is their “inten[tion] to protect values considered important by the whole international
community.”3 And along with the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Rome Statute itself draws on this notion of
common interest or identity. The preamble begins with a reference to the
drafters’ consciousness “that all peoples are united by common bonds, their
cultures pieced together in a shared heritage.”4 It acknowledges the roots of
the Court, of the movement for international justice, in the unimaginable
atrocities of the twentieth century against millions of children, women, and
men that shocked the “conscience of humanity.”5
The “international” in international criminal law thus represents far more
than a mere demarcation of jurisdiction in international courts, rather than domestic ones; and it has significance beyond identifying that the sources of law
for these courts are treaties or customary international law, rather than domestic statutes. Instead, international criminal law is international because it is a
body of law and a set of institutions that are understood to represent shared
global values.
But in the years since the creation of the ICC, the common value of intolerance for mass atrocity crimes has had to exist alongside a new purported
common value: the value of support for the prosecution by the ICC of those
who commit those crimes. The tension for the international community, then,
is that the field has become institutionalized—but not universally. The
1
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creation of the Rome Statute means not only that there are parties, but also
non-parties.
And these are not supportive non-parties, nor are they uninterested nonparties, content to sit on the sidelines. The early years of the ICC of course
featured some opposition from prominent non-parties, but those early years
also saw toleration from non-parties for the activities of the Court, such as the
decisions by China and the United States to abstain in the Security Council’s
decision to refer the situation in Darfur to the Court.6 But over time, some
non-parties have shifted away from positions of support or indifference. We
are now living in the world of angry, defiant non-parties—of the John Boltons
who say the Court is dead to them7 and the Burundis who “rejoice” in this
display of American fury toward the ICC.8
If we compare the world of international criminal law today to what existed in the 1990s, as David Tolbert discusses in his contribution to this symposium,9 there appears to have been broader global support for the values of
intolerance for mass atrocity crimes then versus now. Even if we compare the
world of international criminal law today to what existed in the late 2000s, a
time when I was in the U.S. government advising on the ICC’s new case
against Omar al Bashir, opposition to the Court is more extreme.
So, what are we to make of this apparent decline in support, and the attacks
on the Court? If opposition to the Court could be understood as mere opposition to one particular institution, to one particular treaty, perhaps it would not
be so alarming to those who count themselves as advocates of greater intolerance for mass atrocity crimes. But opposition to the Court is not merely opposition to one institution. And that is because the prevailing understanding
is that the ICC is not just one institution; it is not just one treaty regime.
Instead, the ICC is viewed often as the culmination of the development of
the field of international criminal law—it is the ultimate goal, the crowning
achievement. In scholarly, practice, and public circles, the ICC has become
synonymous with the entire field of international criminal law—and for some,
the entire project of accountability for mass atrocity crimes.
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The creation of the ICC is, of course, a massive achievement in the field
of international criminal justice. But it has also been viewed as the highest
achievement of the field. And along with that, prosecution in the ICC has
become a primary lens for examining and understanding justice in the context
of mass atrocity, and for understanding success in the fight against mass atrocity crimes. We come together today, for example, not to discuss how to prevent mass atrocity crimes, and not even to address the broader array of efforts
at accountability such as the rise of universal jurisdiction prosecutions in recent days. Instead, we come together today to focus our attention on the ICC.
And in part as a result of this association of the Court with the broader
field, the division of the international community around the issue of the Court
has come to represent a larger division around the very ideas behind the
Court—that intolerance for mass atrocity crimes, and the refusal to let the
systematic infliction of suffering go unnoticed. This conflation of the ICC
and international criminal law means that the common values that once were
the province of the entire field have become the territory of the Court. And
with the division of the world into parties and non-parties, the values associated with the field, that are now increasingly tied to the Court, become the
property of a subset of states rather than the whole. They become representations of the values of some, but not all.
Perhaps this is just a necessary reckoning with the fact that there is not a
unified international community behind this intolerance for mass crime. But
to the extent we find there is still broad intolerance for these acts that constitute the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, we should remember that the
ICC is just a court, and the Rome Statute just a treaty.
We might do well to separate the substantive norms from the procedural
institution set up to protect them in a particular way. That is, the recognition
of this fracturing can be taken as a call, once again, to remember that the ICC
is just one institution; and it is one institution that dispenses one form of justice. The seeming disintegration of the international community around the
work of the ICC might indeed be a fracturing of a community that once existed
around shared intolerance for mass victimization; or it might be a fracturing
of the community (or a recognition that there was no such community) that
favored this particular method of enforcement.
I propose, then, that the division of the world into states parties and nonstates parties, for those of us who support the larger project of international
reckoning for mass atrocity crimes, should serve as another call for pluralization of these efforts to protect the substantive norms, and for greater attention
to the political and cultural work that needs to be done alongside the legal
work.

